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Abstract
A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures
can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the
electorate information about the candidate’s intended policy. When this model is extended
to allow for a contributing interest group, it appears that for campaigning to be informative
it is sometimes crucial that campaign funds are supplied by informed third parties. The
extension also provides an explanation why interest groups contribute to the candidate’s
campaign, rather than using direct endorsements; they may need the candidate as an
intermediary to filter their opposing interests.
JEL classification: D72
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1. Introduction
When faced with the problem whom to vote for in an election, voters rely on
several sources of information. Among these are: relevant past experience with the
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Ž .candidates or parties, political campaigns, and in direct endorsements by interest
groups. Empirical evidence suggests that information from each of these sources
influences voters’ decisions. 1 Theoretically, the impact of past experience can be
understood – and has indeed been modeled – from an adaptive behavior or
Ž Ž . .learning perspective see Calvert 1986 for a survey . The influence of campaigns
and endorsements is not so clear, however. In an election campaign a candidate
Ž .announces the policy s he suggests to implement. But the non-transparency of
many policy proposals may cause voters not to understand the impact of these
policies. In addition, they may think of policy promises as being non-credible.
Hence, it is not completely clear what kind of information is transmitted through
campaigning and, thus, why ‘campaign spending buys votes’, as is typically
assumed in voting models with campaign expenditures. 2 Furthermore, since the
Ž .campaign chest a candidate has at his her disposal is often larded by interest
groups, the fact that a candidate is able to spend a lot on a campaign could indicate
Ž .that s he received a large amount of contributions. In this respect Grossman and
Ž .Helpman 1994 suggest that the size of contributions shows the candidate’s
ability as a fund-raiser and thus serves as a kind of indirect endorsement. 3
However, rather than contributing to the candidate’s campaign, interest groups
could also devote their money to direct endorsements. Such an endorsement may
reveal information either because the endorser always reports honestly or, more
realistically, because one has information about the interests of the strategically
1 Ž .Concerning past experience, see the overview and the results provided in Schram 1989 . The
influence of political campaigns follows from the empirically observed positive impact of campaign
Ž .expenditures on the probability of winning cf. Morton and Cameron, 1992 . Endorsements are found
Ž . Ž . Ž .to be influential by Lupia 1994a , Rapoport et al. 1991 , Schneider and Naumann 1982 , and to a
Ž .lesser extent by Williams 1994 .
2 Most theoretical models that relate voters’ decisions to campaign spending treat the transformation
Žof money into votes as a black box by using a vote production function see e.g. Baron, 1994; Magee et
.al., 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Helsley and O’Sullivan, 1994; Snyder, 1989 . Exceptions are
some theoretical studies where it is assumed that political campaigns convey useful information to the
Žvoter by decreasing the variance of perceived policy positions in a probabilistic voting model see
.Austen-Smith, 1987; Hinich and Munger, 1989; Mayer and Li, 1994 . However, in these models the
technical relationship between expenditures and the variance of perceived policies is assumed and not
explained.
3 Ž . Ž .Helsley and O’Sullivan 1994 and Lohmann 1993 also suggest that the size of campaign
contributions can be informative to voters. Alternatively, the size of a candidate’s campaign chest can
Ž .also be informative to other potential candidates. Epstein and Zemskey 1995 focus on the latter role
of campaign contributions. In their signaling model the incumbent employs strategic fund-raising to
deter strong challengers from entering the political fray. By raising a lot of funds, the incumbent tries
to convince potential challengers that he is of ‘high’ quality, and thus very hard to beat in an election.
As opposed to our setup, in the Epstein and Zemskey model contributors are not incorporated as
Ž .explicit strategic actors.
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acting endorser. 4 There is some evidence suggesting that in practice direct
endorsements are taken to be less important in influencing election outcomes than
Žcampaign contributions, and are mostly used by labor unions cf. Schlozman and
.Tierney, 1986 .
In this paper we are interested in the following questions concerning the
strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior. First, how and
when can campaign expenditures affect the information of a voter and thereby
influence the voting decision? Second, are there circumstances under which
Ž .political campaigns need contributions indirect endorsements from interest groups
in order to be effective? Third, why would interest groups contribute to the
campaign of a candidate or party when they can also reach out to the voters
directly? Finally, under what circumstances are campaigns and endorsements in
the interest of the different agents involved?
The goal of this paper is to provide some answers to these questions within a
single analytical framework. To that purpose a simple model is presented concern-
ing an election with an incumbent and a challenger competing for the vote of a
representative voter. The incumbent’s policy position is assumed to be known to
the voter on the basis of the incumbent’s past performance. The position of the
challenger, however, cannot be established by the voter on the basis of past
experience, nor can the content of the challenger’s political campaign give the
voter direct information in this respect. We show that the informational value of
the challenger’s campaign may lie solely in its costs. 5 In the benchmark model,
that we consider first, the challenger relies on own resources for campaigning.
Then the model is extended to account for the fact that campaign expenditures are
funded by interest groups. In this extended model a donating interest group
Ž .donor is introduced which is assumed to be informed about the policy position of
the challenger. The voter, on the other hand, is supposed to be aware of the
preferences of the donor. Finally, the extended model is compared with a model in
4 Endorsements by informed parties are incorporated into models of elections by McKelvey and
Ž . Ž .Ordeshook 1985 and Grofman and Norrander 1990 , and in models of direct legislation by Cameron
Ž . Ž . Ž .and Jung 1992 and Lupia 1992 . Only in Cameron and Jung 1992 the endorser acts strategically,
but contrary to the approach taken in this paper, these endorsements are costless for the endorser. In
Ž . Ž .Lupia and McCubbins 1994 and Epstein and O’Halloran 1995 strategic endorsements by interest
groups are directed at the legislature rather than at the general voting public, and used by legislators to
control the bureaucracy.
5 In this respect the model differs from most other theoretical models of political campaigning.
Ž .Chappell 1994 , for instance, assumes that campaign advertising is completely informative about the
Ž .candidate’s policy position and, moreover, truthful. Harrington 1992 assumes that political campaigns
are costless and explores under what conditions these cheap talk messages are informative. Finally, in
Ž .Banks 1990 campaigns are only costly to the winning candidate. These costs are assumed to represent
the candidate’s loss of reputation due to lying and are increasing in the difference between the policy
proposed in the campaign and the policy implemented. In this paper the costs of a campaign are
independent of its content.
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which the interest group can reach out to the voters directly by spending money on
direct endorsements.
Our results explain why voters respond positively to campaign spending. As
Ž . Ž .already hinted at by Austen-Smith 1991 and Calvert 1986, pp. 53–54 , the
amount of campaign expenditures provides information about the preferences of
the candidate and, hence, her or his policy position. For campaign expenditures
and information transmission to occur in equilibrium it is required, however, that
Žthe candidate’s preferences are not too divergent from the voter’s cf. Cho and
.Sobel, 1990 . This requirement explains why it can be crucial for the candidate
that campaigns are financed by interest groups. If the candidate’s preferences are
too divergent but the donor’s preferences are not, information transfer through
campaigning is still possible when the campaign is financed by the donor. For
similar reasons it turns out that, although it may not be possible for an interest
Ž .group to influence the voting decision through direct endorsements, this may be
feasible by using the indirect route of campaign contributions. The analysis shows
under what circumstances the direct or the indirect route will be preferred.
Although political campaigns and endorsements cannot make the voter worse off
in our model – ex ante – only in specific cases they do provide the voter useful
information. The resources spent on these activities may be a pure social waste,
therefore.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The analysis starts in
Section 2 with a formal model describing the link between campaign expenditures
Ž .and voting behavior, as suggested by Austen-Smith 1991 . The model will be
used as a benchmark in later sections. In Section 3 this model is extended by
introducing a donating interest group. Section 4 addresses the question why
interest groups may donate to a candidate’s campaign instead of reaching out to
the voters directly via endorsements. A concluding discussion is presented in
Section 5. Apart from summarizing the main results, this section discusses some
Ž .comparative statics results obtained from the model in light of existing empirical
evidence. In addition, a number of interesting extensions of the model are
discussed.
2. Campaign expenditures and voting
In this section the benchmark model with campaign expenditures as costly
signals is presented. We consider a simple two-player signaling game with a
challenger C and a voter V. 6 The voter must either vote for the incumbent or for
6 Ž .For notational convenience, voters and donors introduced in Section 3 will be indicated as
females, and incumbents and challengers as males.
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the challenger. Using the incumbent’s past voting record the voter is informed
about the type of the incumbent, i.e. what kind of policy is to be expected once the
incumbent is reelected. On the other hand, the voter is uncertain about the policy
Ž .position of the challenger. A priori there are two possibilities neglecting ties :
either the policy position of the challenger fits the preferences of the voter better
than the incumbent’s position, or it fits her preferences worse. If the former holds
Ž .the state of the world t is ‘Better’ and the challenger is said to be of the good
type, if the latter holds the state of the world equals ‘Worse’ and the challenger is
labeled to be of the bad type. In the first case the voter would want to elect the
Ž .challenger take action xsC , whereas in the second case she would prefer to
Ž .vote for the incumbent xs I . The prior probability that the challenger is of the
good type equals p, with 0-p-1. The goal of the challenger is to get elected,
which gives him an incentive to make the voter believe that his policy is better,
irrespective of whether in fact this is true or not. Hence, the challenger and the
voter have partially conflicting interests.
The voter is assumed to be completely informed about the preferences of both
the good and the bad type challenger. To capture in a simple way the idea that
voters may find it difficult to assess the implications andror credibility of policy
proposals, campaigning is modeled such that the content of a proposal provides no
direct information to the voter. The voter can use the observable campaign
Ž .expenditures, though, as indirect information concerning the policy stance type
of the challenger. The mere fact that the challenger spends a lot of money on his
campaign may indicate that he will implement a policy the voter likes. We assume
that to run an effective campaign the challenger has to spend a fixed amount of
money yq)0. The challenger can thus either decide to campaign at cost yq or
Ž .not to campaign at all at zero costs .
The order of moves in the model is summarized as follows. First nature picks
 4the type of the challenger tg Worse, Better , with the probability that the good
Ž . Ž .type is selected psP tsBetter s1yP tsWorse . Only the challenger ob-
serves his type. Then the challenger decides whether to spend the fixed amount of
money yq on campaigning, or to spend no money at all. Finally, the voter
Ž q.observes the level of campaign expenditures 0 or y and either elects the
Ž . Ž .incumbent xs I or the challenger xsC . Without loss of generality we can
normalize the payoffs over action–state pairs such that they are given by the
following matrix:
tsWorse tsBetter
xs I Õ 0 0 0 0 01
xsC 0 c d Õ c d1 1 2 2 2
The first entry in each cell refers to the voter’s payoff and the second to the
Žchallenger’s gross payoff, where it is assumed that Õ , c )0 for is1, 2 the thirdi i
.entry will not be used until the next section . The challenger’s net payoff follows
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by subtracting the campaign costs from his gross payoff. Since the voter should
actually prefer the candidate she is hypothesized to prefer, Õ and Õ are taken to1 2
be strictly positive. Regarding these preferences two cases can be distinguished:
the case in which the voter, on the basis of the prior, would elect the incumbent
Ž w x.requiring that p-Õ'Õ r Õ qÕ , and the opposite case where she is a priori1 1 2
Ž .inclined to choose the challenger p)Õ . The assumption that the challenger
wants to get elected is reflected by assuming both c and c to be positive. The1 2
setup of the game and the payoff matrix are common knowledge, i.e. known to
both the voter and the challenger.
As the focus of this paper is on the effect of campaign spending on voting
behavior via its impact on the voter’s information, we are interested in how much
information can be revealed in equilibrium. In order to compare and classify
Ž .different perfect Bayesian equilibria by the amount of information which is
revealed, we use the following standard terminology:
1. In a pooling equilibrium both challenger types choose to run a costly campaign
with the same probability.
2. In a hybrid equilibrium either both challenger types choose to run a costly
campaign with positive, but nonequal, probabilities, or both challenger types
choose to refrain from campaigning with positive, but nonequal, probabilities
Ž .or both .
3. In a separating equilibrium one challenger type chooses to run a costly
campaign with certainty, whereas the other challenger type always chooses not
to campaign at all.
In a pooling equilibrium each challenger type employs exactly the same
Žstrategy and the voter does not get additional information from observing the
.absence of the challenger’s campaign. That is, in such an uninformative equilib-
rium the voter does not get useful information to update her prior belief. In a
hybrid equilibrium some, but not all information is revealed. Since in this kind of
Ž q.equilibrium there is a level of campaigning 0 or y which both challenger types
choose with positive probability, the observation of this level of campaigning does
not lead to a decisive answer concerning the challenger’s type. However, due to
the fact that both types choose this level with different probabilities, some
inferences can be made to improve upon the prior belief. In a separating
equilibrium all information is revealed since the strategies of the challenger types
are completely opposed. After campaigning the voter knows the type of the
challenger for sure and she takes the same decision as in case she knew the
Ž .challenger’s type beforehand complete information model .
We now want to explore under what conditions an informative, i.e. hybrid or
separating, equilibrium exists. The following proposition is due to Potters and Van
Ž . Ž . ŽWinden 1992 and Ainsworth 1993 . Proofs of propositions are available upon
.request .
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Proposition 1. 7
Ž .a A pooling equilibrium always exists.
Ž .b A necessary and sufficient condition for a hybrid equilibrium to exist is:
i p-Õ and yq-c -c or ii p)Õ and max yq, c -c . 4Ž . Ž .1 2 1 2
Ž .c A necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium to exist
is: c -yq-c .1 2
Corollary 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for information reÕelation to
be possible in equilibrium is giÕen by the ‘Information ReÕelation by CAmpaign-
Ž .  q 4ing ’ IRCA condition: max y , c -c .1 2
The first part of the proposition shows that the class of uninformative equilibria
is rather robust, for this class is never empty. 8 The corollary, obtained from
Ž . Ž .combining parts b and c of the proposition, makes clear that information
revelation is only possible when two conditions are satisfied. Firstly, and rather
trivially, information revelation requires that the cost of campaigning is not
prohibitive for the good type challenger. Intuitively, when it is always too
expensive for the good type challenger to run a campaign, the observation of such
a campaign is a clear signal of the challenger being of the bad type. But, the bad
type wants to conceal his identity and thus will never run a costly campaign when
this leads to all information being revealed. So, when c -yq only pooling on2
no-campaigning can occur in equilibrium.
Ž .Secondly, and more interestingly, a certain sorting condition c -c on the1 2
challenger’s preferences must be met. For campaigning costs to possess informa-
tional value the challenger should value his election more highly when the voter is
satisfied with her decision ex post. Such a sorting condition, requiring a degree of
Ž .consonance between the objectives of the decision maker the voter and the agent
Ž .affected by the decision the challenger is characteristic for models concerning
Ž .the strategic transmission of information cf. Cho and Sobel, 1990 . The intuition
for the sorting condition is as follows. In case the sorting condition does not hold
the bad type challenger always has an incentive to exactly mimic the behavior of
the good type challenger. When c )c the bad type has a larger stake in1 2
persuading the voter to elect him than the good type challenger. As a consequence,
7 Here, and in the sequel, we disregard border cases like ps Õ, c sc and yqsc for is1, 2.1 2 i
8 This part of the proposition is valid mainly because we do not employ a refinement concept that
reduces the number of plausible equilibria. For instance, the statement does not hold when we use an
Ž .equilibrium refinement like universal divinity cf. Potters and Van Winden, 1992 ; when p- Õ, this
Ž .refinement deletes the unique pooling equilibrium whenever the IRCA condition holds. Since
equilibrium refinements typically only restrict out-of-equilibrium beliefs, they do not delete equilibria
Ž .in the signaling game considered here in which some or all information is revealed.
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when the good type is motivated to run a costly campaign in order to get elected,
the bad type is motivated to campaign as well. Under these circumstances,
campaigning cannot be informative.
There are several reasons why the sorting condition might hold. It is reasonable
to assume that the challenger has an easier time during his term of office when his
policy position is in harmony with the voter’s preferences. The power of elected
Žoffice may be positively related to the politician’s popularity cf. Harrington,
.1992 . Another justification could be given by reelection considerations. When the
voter is satisfied with her decision ex post the winner of the current election fits
the preferences of the electorate rather well and has a higher chance of reelection
in the next election. The latter justification resembles the one given by Kihlstrom
Ž . Ž .and Riordan 1984 and Milgrom and Roberts 1986 for a similar sorting
condition concerning the greater willingness of high quality producers of an
experience good to spend money on directly uninformative advertisements, com-
pared with low quality producers. They justify that assumption by referring to
repeated purchases by consumers. Only high quality producers will induce re-
peated purchases and, thus, have higher expected sales.
Proposition 1 also makes clear that a separating equilibrium only exists when
the costs of campaigning are prohibitive for the bad type, but not for the good type
challenger. In the unique separating equilibrium the good type runs a costly
campaign with certainty, whereas the bad type rationally refrains from campaign-
ing. In the hybrid equilibria the campaigning strategies of the two challenger types
are partially, but not completely, distinct. When the voter is a priori inclined to
Ž .vote for the incumbent p-Õ , the good type always campaigns and the bad type
Žonly now and then campaigns i.e., plays a mixed strategy; the precise equilibrium
.strategies are specified in the appendix . The absence of a campaign provides the
voter conclusive evidence that the challenger is of the bad type, which induces her
to elect the incumbent. After observing a costly campaign by the challenger,
however, the voter will elect either candidate with positive probability. In the
Ž .opposite case p)Õ , the bad type never runs a costly campaign and the good
type only sometimes campaigns. A costly campaign induces the voter to elect the
challenger with certainty, whereas silence is followed by electing either candidate
Ž .with positive probability. Lastly, in a pooling equilibrium either i the challenger
Ž .never campaigns, or ii the challenger always campaigns. The first pooling
equilibrium always exists, the second only when the voter is a priori inclined to
Ž .vote for the challenger p)Õ . Note that when this latter case applies, i.e. p)Õ,
Ž q .all three types of equilibria may exist at the same time viz. if c -y -c .1 2
When information is transferred the voter modifies her decision as compared
with her decision solely based on prior information. In equilibrium the voter
responds positively to campaign spending. That is, in equilibrium the voter will
never adjust her prior belief p downwards when she observes campaign expendi-
tures by the challenger. This adjustment is rational given that in equilibrium the
good type challenger is at least as likely to engage in campaigning as the bad type
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challenger. Consequently, in equilibrium campaign expenditures by the challenger
increase – or better, do not decrease – his probability of election.
Due to the existence of multiple equilibria, general comparative statics results
are difficult to obtain from the model. Some results are worth mentioning,
however. We focus on the informative equilibria. 9 First, consider the impact of
the challenger’s campaign. When p-Õ the probability that the voter elects the
challenger after observing a campaign is weakly increasing in yq and weakly
decreasing in c . In a sense, the voter discounts the informational value of a1
Ž .campaign, depending on the stake c the bad type has in misinforming her1
relative to the cost of campaigning. A similar result holds when p)Õ since in this
case the gain from campaigning, measured by the increase in the probability of
election, is weakly increasing in yq and weakly decreasing in c . The additional2
Ž .informational value of a campaign to the voter is discounted using the stake c2
the good type has in informing the voter relative to the cost of campaigning.
Besides, campaigning always results in election when p)Õ, but not necessarily
so when p-Õ. In other words, the voter responds more favorable to a political
campaign when she is already a priori inclined to elect the challenger. Secondly,
the expected occurrence of a campaign is weakly increasing in c and weakly1
decreasing in yq when p-Õ. Together with the fact that only pooling on
no-campaigning may occur when c drops below yq, this result suggest that2
campaigns are more likely when the cost decreases or when the stake increases.
Interestingly, the frequency of a campaign equals prÕ in the hybrid equilibrium
when p-Õ, and thus is highest when p is close to Õ. This suggests that
campaigns are more likely when elections are expected to be close, in which case
the voter only needs a small push to elect the challenger.
Finally, some payoff comparisons will be made. We first want to establish
whether the voter benefits from the information extracted from the political
expenditures made by the challenger. Of course, the full information revealing
Ž .separating equilibrium yields the voter the highest expected utility. Perhaps a bit
surprisingly, it appears that the voter is not worse off in the pooling equilibria
compared to the more informative hybrid equilibria. So, the voter does not benefit
in expected utility terms from additional, but incomplete or partial information. In
this context, it should be realized that the strategic transmission of information
9 When p- Õ the informative equilibrium is unique, and either hybrid or separating. In that case the
comparative statics results follow from changes in the equilibrium strategies of the unique equilibrium,
Ž . Ž .or from a switch from the hybrid separating to the separating hybrid equilibrium. When p) Õ a
hybrid and a separating equilibrium may exist side by side. In that case we focus on the comparative
statics of the hybrid equilibrium as its existence is implied by the existence of the separating
equilibrium, whereas the reverse does not hold. Focusing on the separating equilibrium does not give
substantially different results, however.
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involves that the voter is sometimes misled. In the hybrid equilibrium when p-Õ
the voter is sometimes misled by the costly campaign of the bad type challenger.
Ž .In the other hybrid equilibrium only possible when p)Õ the voter is now and
then misled by the absence of a costly campaign from the good type challenger.
On the other hand, in these equilibria the voter is sometimes completely informed;
namely when she does not observe costly campaigning in case p-Õ, or does
observe a costly campaign when p)Õ. Overall, in a hybrid equilibrium the
expected loss from sometimes being misled and the expected gain from now and
then being fully informed cancel out, and the voter receives the same expected
Ž .utility as in case campaign expenditures information transmission were not
possible.
Next we turn to the welfare implications for the challenger. We compare the
expected utility for the challenger in the informative campaigning equilibria with
his expected utility in case the voter’s decision is based on a priori information
Ž .i.e., when campaigning is not possible . Rather intuitively, both challenger types
Ž .appear to be better not worse off having the option to campaign when the voter
Ž .is a priori inclined to vote against the challenger p-Õ . However, in the
Ž .opposite case p)Õ the challenger would rather see that campaigning were not
possible. So, from an ex ante perspective, the challenger only values the option to
campaign in case the voter is a priori inclined to elect the incumbent.
In the pooling or non-informative equilibria the behavior of the voter is
unaffected by the challenger’s campaign expenditures. Hence, when expenditures
are made in these equilibria they constitute a pure social waste. The challenger
would be better off and the voter would not be worse off if campaigning were not
possible. Note, however, that such a wasteful pooling equilibrium only exists in
case the voter is already a priori inclined to elect the challenger.
3. Campaign contributions and voting
Electoral campaigns are often financed by the contributions of interest groups.
In the U.S. candidates running for a seat in Congress typically rely on funds
provided to them by donors. In this section we account for this observation by
extending our benchmark model of the previous section. Specifically, we introduce
a third player, the donor D, which may contribute to the candidate’s campaign.
The literature provides two, not mutually exclusive, motives for why interest
Ž .groups contribute to a candidate’s campaign cf. Morton and Cameron, 1992 .
Interest groups may either try to get their favored candidates elected, or they may
try to influence the policy positions of the candidates. Theoretical models of
campaign contributions can be divided, by and large, along this motivational line.
So-called position-induced or support models focus on the electoral motive of
Ž .contributions e.g. Austen-Smith, 1987; Baron, 1994; Magee et al., 1989 ,
service-induced or exchange models on the ‘quid pro quo’ motive of supplying
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Ž . 10campaign funds e.g. Baron, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1994 . In our
extension of the benchmark model we focus on the electoral motive of campaign
contributions. Campaign contributions are used by the donor to enable the
challenger to transmit information to the voter through costly campaigning. In this
way, the donor tries to get the challenger elected. 11
The extended model has the following setup. First the donor D decides whether
q Ž .to contribute a fixed amount y )0 to the campaign of the challenger or not,
before the challenger takes his campaign decision. It is assumed that the donor
knows the type of the challenger, and that the challenger is entirely dependent on
the contributions of the donor to cover his campaign cost. In the model considered
here the voter only observes campaign expenditures; donations are not observed.
The voter is assumed to be aware of the fact that the donor knows the type of the
challenger. She also realizes that all campaign money spent by the challenger is
provided by the donor. Since the voter knows the preferences of the donor and the
challenger in each possible state of the world she can use campaign expenditures
as a signal of the challenger’s type.
To give the challenger a substantive role it is assumed that he can use the
donation for other purposes than his campaign, and that these alternative uses yield
direct utility. In this context one may think of expensive dinners, luxurious trips,
and so on. Another justification might be that the challenger wants to save for
Žfuture elections or has to retire campaign debts from previous elections cf.
.Grossman and Helpman, 1994 . When the voter does not observe campaign
efforts, she cannot be sure whether this is due to the fact that the challenger did
not receive contributions, or decided to use the contributions for other purposes.
When the challenger does not receive any contributions he is restricted to not
campaigning. In short, the order of moves in this three player game is as follows.
 4 Ž .Nature picks the type of challenger tg Worse, Better with psP tsBetter s1
Ž .yP tsWorse , and this type is revealed to both the challenger and the donor.
Since the donor possesses the same information as the challenger, she is said to be
Ž .of the same type; the donor who knows that the challenger is of the good bad
Ž .type is referred to as the good bad type donor. After observing her type the donor
decides whether to contribute or not and, subsequently, the challenger decides
whether to spend any contributions on a campaign or not. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the challenger either has to spend the contributions on his campaign
or on other purposes; he cannot split contributions between these two alternatives.
Ž .Finally, the voter observes the absence of campaign expenditures and elects
either the challenger or the incumbent.
10 Ž .The recent model of Grossman and Helpman 1996 combines aspects of both types of models.
11 As pointed out by a referee, to the extent that campaign contributions are motivated by ‘quid pro
quo’ considerations, and recognized as such by voters, the informational value of contributions will
likely to be attenuated. Thus, our focus on the electoral motive of campaign contributions may
somewhat overstate their informational role.
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The normalized payoffs over action–state pairs are given by the matrix
presented in the previous section. The first entry in each cell again refers to the
voter’s payoff, the second to the challenger’s gross payoff, and the third entry now
refers to the donor’s gross payoff. To get the challenger’s net payoff one must add
the contributions that are not used for campaigning. The donor’s net payoff
follows by subtracting her donation from the gross payoff. A priori we do not put
any restrictions on d and d . Four different cases can be distinguished, based on1 2
the donor’s preferences:
Ž .I No conflict with the voter’s‘ interests: d_1-0-d_2.
Ž .II Full conflict with the voter’s interests: d_2-0-d_1.
Ž .III Partial conflict with the voter’s interests, and incumbent preferred: d_1,
d_2-0.
Ž .IV Partial conflict with the voter’s interests, and challenger preferred: d_1,
d_2)0.
It must be realized that, although the donor always has the same type as the
challenger, she may prefer the incumbent. Possessing the same information as the
challenger does not imply having the same interests as the challenger. To
investigate whether the scope for information transfer by campaign expenditures is
altered, and in what direction, we employ the same approach as in the previous
Ž .section. Different types of equilibria for the extended donor model are classified
using the same standard terminology. However, rather than just focusing on the
Ž .campaigning strategy of the challenger, we now look at the combined behavior
Ž .of the donor–challenger combination. The probability that the good bad type
donor–challenger combination runs a costly campaign is given by the probability
Ž . Ž .that the good bad type donor contributes times the probability that the good bad
type challenger spends this money on his campaign. The classification of equilib-
ria for the extended model is based on the differences in the campaigning
strategies of the two types of donor–challenger combinations. In a pooling
equilibrium the campaigning strategies do not differ between the two types, in a
Ž . Ž .hybrid separating equilibrium these strategies are partially completely opposed.
Conditions for the existence of the three types of equilibria are given in Proposi-
tion 2, which is similar to Proposition 1.
Proposition 2.
Ž .a A pooling equilibrium always exists.
Ž .b A necessary and sufficient condition for a hybrid equilibrium to exist is:
Ž . q  4  4i p-Õ and y -min c , d -min c , d , or1 1 2 2
Ž .  q  44  4ii p)Õ and max y , min c , d -min c , d .1 1 2 2
Ž .c A necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium to exist
 4 q  4is: min c , d -y -min c , d .1 1 2 2
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Corollary 2. A necessary and sufficient condition for information reÕelation to
be possible in equilibrium is giÕen by the ‘Information ReÕelation by COntribu-
Ž .  q  44  4tions’ IRCO condition: max y ,min c , d -min c , d .1 1 2 2
The corollary shows that contributions and subsequent campaign expenditures
Ž .possibly influence voter’s information only when a certain IRCO condition on
both the donor’s and the challenger’s preferences is satisfied. As was the case with
the benchmark model of the previous section this restriction incorporates two
Ž q  4.separate conditions. The first condition y -min c , d entails that contributing2 2
and campaigning are not too costly for the good type donor and the good type
challenger, respectively. When it is never rational for either the good type donor to
contribute or for the good type challenger to run a campaign, the observation of a
campaign is a clear signal of the combination being of the bad type. Since the bad
Žtype challenger does not want to reveal his identity due to the assumption that
.c )0 , he will never spend any contributions received in this case, making it1
irrational for the bad type donor to contribute. Consequently, when the donor’s
Ž .interests fully conflict with the interests of the voter case II or when she prefers
Ž . qthe incumbent case III – in which cases d -y – the donor will not contribute2
to the challenger’s campaign. No information can be revealed in these situations.
 4  4The more interesting second condition of IRCO – min c , d -min c , d –1 1 2 2
concerns a generalized sorting condition. Necessarily, either the preferences of the
Ž . Ž .challenger c -c or the preferences of the donor d -d must satisfy the1 2 1 2
sorting condition. For the donor–challenger combination it is required that the
preferences of at least one of the agents carry information in the right direction,
which means that the good type should have the largest stake to persuade the
voter. Perhaps surprisingly, this latter condition is not sufficient. For instance,
when d -c -d -c the sorting condition for the challenger is satisfied2 1 1 2
Ž .c -c , but the generalized sorting condition for the donor–challenger combina-1 2
tion is not met and information transfer is not possible. When the sorting condition
is satisfied for both the donor and the challenger, however, the generalized sorting
condition is also satisfied.
Ž .Reasons why the sorting condition c -c could hold for the challenger have1 2
already been given the previous section. The case d -d could represent a1 2
situation in which an on-going relationship with a politician is valued more highly
when the electorate would be satisfied with him ex post. A popular politician may
have more discretion in providing specific benefits to interest groups. Another
justification could be given by assuming the interest group to be encompassing,
Ž .and hence more aligned from the voter’s perspective cf. Olson, 1982 .
The intuition for the generalized sorting condition runs as follows. In an
informative equilibrium the good type donor–challenger combination necessarily
campaigns with a strictly larger probability than the bad type combination. When
the generalized sorting condition is not met, the bad type combination always
wants to campaign with certainty when the good type combination campaigns with
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positive probability. In the example with d -c -d -c , if the gains d and2 1 1 2 2
the probability that the challenger spends the funds received are large enough for
the good type donor to contribute to the challenger, the stake for the bad type
challenger c is certainly large enough to justify the spending of contributions on a1
Ž .campaign as d -c . Since d -d , however, this induces the bad type donor2 1 2 1
always to contribute to the challenger and, thus, the bad type combination to
campaign with certainty. This cannot lead to an informative equilibrium, but only
to a pooling equilibrium in which both types of the donor–challenger combination
always campaign.
Proposition 2 shows that the IRCO condition is also sufficient for an informa-
tive equilibrium to exist. Due to the existence of other, non-informative equilibria
the condition is not sufficient for information transfer actually to occur in
Ž .equilibrium, though. In these non-informative pooling equilibria either i the
Ž .donor never contributes, or ii the donor always contributes and the challenger
always spend the contributions received on his campaign. Contrary to the first
pooling equilibrium, the second pooling equilibrium only exists when the voter is
Ž .a priori inclined to vote for the challenger p)Õ .
The unique separating equilibrium requires not only that the costs of contribut-
ing are prohibitive for the bad type donor or campaigning is a dominated choice
for the bad type challenger, but also that the costs of contributing are not
prohibitive for the good type donor and campaigning is an undominated choice for
the good type challenger. The hybrid equilibria resemble those of the benchmark
model in the previous section in which the challenger has to rely on his own
resources. More specifically, the combined behavior of the donor–challenger
combination in the present extended model with a donor is similar to the behavior
of the challenger which has to rely on his own funds. When p-Õ a hybrid
equilibrium may exist in which the bad type donor always donates though the
challenger sometimes keeps the money, or a hybrid equilibrium in which the bad
type donor does not always provide funds although the challenger always uses the
funds for his campaign. In either case, the good type combination campaigns with
certainty. When p)Õ the bad type donor–challenger combination never cam-
paigns in the hybrid equilibria. Either the good type donor or the good type
Ž .challenger or each of them mixes between the pure strategies, but a campaign
from the good type challenger always occurs with the same positive probability.
It should be noted that in any pooling, hybrid or separating equilibrium the
good type donor is at least as likely to contribute to the challenger as the bad type
donor. Moreover, in equilibrium the voter is at least as likely to observe campaign
expenditures by the challenger in case the challenger fits her preferences better as
in the opposite case. This implies that in equilibrium the voter will never respond
negatively to campaign spending by electing the challenger with a lower probabil-
ity.
The comparative statics results obtained for the benchmark model also hold for
Ž .the extended model. Instead of focusing on the stake for the challenger c ini
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getting elected, we now have to consider the stake for the donor–challenger
 4combination. The latter is given by min c , d , that is, the stake of the agent in thei i
combination who has the weakest incentive to get the challenger elected. For
instance, it is obtained that the impact of a campaign is weakly increasing in yq
 4and weakly decreasing in min c , d when p-Õ, and that p)Õ is required to be1 1
Žassured of election after campaigning. On the other hand, a campaign and thus a
.donation is again more likely when the costs are lower, the stakes of both the
donor and the challenger are higher, and when the electoral contest is expected to
Ž .be close p close to Õ .
It is immaterial to the voter whether the campaign is funded by either a donor
or by the challenger himself, given that the same amount of information is being
revealed. So, using the results of the benchmark model, it can be concluded that
the voter will not lose from the possibility of contributions, and only gains from a
donor funded campaign when separation is possible. Both the donor and the
Ž .challenger weakly value the possibilities for information revelation when p-Õ.
So, from an ex ante perspective the donor and challenger value the possibility of
making contributions in this case. When p)Õ the donor may either like the
Ž .possibilities for information transfer bad type donor when d -0 or dislike them.1
In the latter case the voter is already inclined to take the decision preferred by the
donor, and information transfer is only costly for the donor. As the prior belief of
Ž .the voter favors the challenger when p)Õ, the challenger weakly dislikes the
possibility of information transfer and would rather see that campaigning, even
with the funds of others, were not possible. In the hybrid equilibria, for instance,
the gain from sometimes pocketing the contributions received does not offset the
loss due to the voter sometimes electing the incumbent. Of course, given that the
two ways of financing a campaign lead to the same amount of information being
revealed, the challenger would rather campaign with the money of others. How-
ever, the type of funding may render different opportunities for information
revelation, as will be discussed now.
In order to determine whether the scope for information transfer depends on the
supplier of campaign funds we compare the situation that the challenger has
resources of his own with the situation that the funds are supplied by an interest
group. Comparing Corollaries 1 and 2, it is easily seen that the conditions IRCA
and IRCO are not overlapping. The fulfillment of IRCA does not entail the
satisfaction of IRCO, nor does the reverse hold. The fact that the challenger is
dependent on the funds of the donor sometimes enlarges the scope for information
transfer. For instance, when yq-d -c -c -d the challenger’s sorting condi-1 2 1 2
tion is not met and campaigning by using own resources has no impact on the
voter’s information. Information transfer is only possible when the challenger
campaigns with the money supplied by the donor. In this case the challenger
exploits the fact that the preferences of the supplier of funds do satisfy the sorting
condition. On the other hand, the dependence on the donor’s money may also
reduce the possibilities for information transfer. When yq-d -d -c -c , for2 1 1 2
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instance, the IRCA condition holds but the IRCO condition does not. The only
way for campaigning to be informative is that the challenger has his own
resources. The donor’s interests are too opposed to the voter’s interests in this case
to make information transfer through contributions possible. Thus, it can be
concluded that the challenger sometimes needs the fact that funds are supplied by
a donor in order to transfer information, and in other cases needs money of his
own. More generally, the scope for information transfer is altered by introducing a
donating interest group, but not in an unequivocal way.
4. Direct endorsements versus campaign contributions
Up till now we have assumed that the donor can only contribute to the
challenger’s campaign. In this section we extend the analysis by considering the
possibility that the donor can either contribute to the challenger’s campaign, or
endorse the challenger by sending a costly signal directly to the voter. For ease of
exposition, we draw our conclusions from comparing the results of two separate
models; the contributions model presented in Section 3, and a model discussed
Ž .below in which only costly endorsements are possible. However, as follows from
the more general model considered in the appendix, exactly the same results are
obtained when the interest group’s choice between endorsing and contributing is
actually made endogenous. First, the endorsement model will be discussed. As
with campaigns, it will be shown that the informative value of endorsements may
lie in their costs. Then endorsements are compared with contributions.
Suppose, first, that the donor has only the option of direct endorsements. Like
political campaigns, we assume that the content of an endorsement does not
provide the voter direct information. Rather, the voter may use the observable
Ž .fixed costs of an endorsement as indirect information concerning the challenger’s
policy stance. This leads to a model that is formally equivalent to the model of
Section 2. We just have to replace the challenger by the donor in the description of
the two player signaling game. Hence the analysis of that section is applicable.
ŽSubstituting d for c , Proposition 1 can be used for the case d , d )0 case IVi i 1 2
. 12as defined in the previous section . From this proposition we know that, in case
the donor prefers the challenger, direct endorsements can only be informative
 q 4when the condition max y , d -d is satisfied. Under full conflict of interests1 2
Ž .between the voter and the donor case II , no information revelation will occur by
using direct endorsements. 13 In case III, in which the donor prefers the incum-
12 Ž .Note the assumption that donating and subsequent campaigning and endorsing are equally costly.
Though rather restrictive, the assumption allows us to focus on the differences in information revelation
between two equally costly options for the donor.
13 The sorting condition d - d must hold for the possibility of information transfer, irrespective of1 2
the sign of the d ’s.i
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bent, the donor would never recommend the voter to vote for the challenger.
ŽDirect endorsements would only be used to support the incumbent although
endorsements are assumed to be directly uninformative, from her knowledge of the
Ž .donor’s preferences, the voter is able to infer that in this case d , d -0 an1 2
.endorsement is meant to support the incumbent . Finally, when there is no conflict
Ž .of interests between the donor and the voter case I , information transfer is, of
course, possible only if the costs of endorsing are not prohibitive for at least one
q  4 14type of donor, i.e. when y -max yd , d . In this case the donor may either1 2
Ž . Ž .endorse the incumbent bad type donor or the challenger good type donor . Since
we are interested in the comparison of using different routes to support the same
candidate, viz. the challenger, we ignore the possibility that the donor directly
endorses the incumbent. 15 This leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 3. A necessary and sufficient condition for information reÕelation to
be possible in equilibrium is giÕen by the ‘Information ReÕelation by Direct
Ž .  q 4Endorsements’ IRDE condition: max y , d -d .1 2
Again, for endorsements to be potentially informative a sorting condition on the
Ž .donor’s preferences must be met d -d . Only when the preferences of the1 2
donor and the voter are sufficiently aligned, direct endorsements can be informa-
tive. To the extent that direct endorsements are indeed meant to inform voters, this
result is in line with Snyder who finds that ‘‘..moderate interest groups should be
more likely than extremist interest groups to try to bring their issue to the attention
Ž .of the general public’’ Snyder, 1991, p. 105 .
Next, suppose the donor has, besides the option of direct endorsements, also the
Žoption of contributing to the challenger’s campaign. From Corollaries 2 and 3 and
q.the fact that pooling on campaigning is excluded when d -y it follows that2
Ž .under full conflict of interests between the voter and the donor case II and in
Ž .case the incumbent is preferred by the donor case III neither contributions nor
endorsements will be used to support the challenger. Consequently, it suffices to
explore the cases I and IV. The next proposition compares the possibilities for
14 Note that in this case both endorser types want to inform rather than misinform the voter. When
the costs of an endorsement are not prohibitive for the good type endorser, this type is prepared to
make a costly endorsement in equilibrium when only a costly endorsement induces the voter to choose
the challenger. In this equilibrium the bad type donor remains silent, where silence is followed by the
voter electing the incumbent. When the costs are not prohibitive for the bad type, a similar equilibrium
exists with the bad type making a costly endorsement to support the incumbent and the good type
remaining silent. When the costs of an endorsement are prohibitive for both types, none of them is
prepared to make a costly endorsement with positive probability.
15 Ž .This amounts to depriving the type i donor with d -0 of the possibility of sending a costlyi
endorsement message. When d )y yq for is1, 2 this restriction is immaterial because in that casei
Ž .the donor will never endorse the incumbent; either the donor prefers the challenger d )0 , or thei
Ž q .donor prefers the incumbent but an endorsement is too expensive y y - d -0 .i
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information revelation by using either channel for these two cases, and is a direct
corollary of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3.
Ž . Ž .a In case of no conflict of interests between the donor and the Õoter case I
Ž .it holds that: when full information transfer is possible by funding the campaign
of the challenger, full information reÕelation is possible by using direct endorse-
ments. The reÕerse does not hold.
Ž . Ž .b When the donor prefers the challenger case IV it holds that:
if i d -d : when information transfer is possible through campaignŽ . 1 2
contributions, information reÕelation is also possible
by direct endorsements. The reÕerse does not hold.
if ii d )d : information transfer is certainly not possible throughŽ . 1 2
direct endorsements, but may be possible through
contributing to the challenger ’s campaign.
The first part of the proposition shows that direct endorsements have a larger
scope for information transfer than contributions when there is no conflict of
interests. In this case the donor does not need the challenger as an intermediary to
transfer information, and under certain conditions the challenger cannot serve as
Ž q.such an intermediary for instance if c -y . The second part indicates when2
contributions to the campaign of the challenger are more informative for the voter
than endorsements. When the sorting condition d -d holds for the donor,1 2
contributions are only more informative when separation is possible by using
contributions, but not by using direct endorsements. This is the case when
c -yq-c , d , d and d -d , that is, when only the bad type challenger is not1 2 1 2 1 2
willing to spend contributions on a campaign. Otherwise, endorsements are at least
as informative as contributions and subsequent campaigning. In case the sorting
Ž .condition does not hold for the preferences of the donor d )d , the indirect1 2
route is more informative whenever information transfer is possible by using
contributions, i.e. whenever the IRCO condition holds. These considerations
Žindicate that under a range of circumstances information transmission and, thus,
.influence on voter behavior is possible only by using contributions, though both
direct endorsements and contributions are options open to the donor. Although in
this case the donor’s preferences carry information in the wrong direction for
using direct endorsements, the donor can exploit – by using the indirect route –
the fact that the challenger’s preferences do satisfy the sorting condition.
Ž .When the donor prefers the challenger case IV and both routes are potentially
Ž .informative i.e. both IRCO and IRDE are satisfied , the scope for complete
information revelation is larger when using contributions. This follows directly
from the conditions for the existence of the separating equilibria. Intuitively,
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separation by contributions is possible when the bad type donor or the bad type
Ž .challenger has a dominated choice cf. Proposition 2c , whereas separation by
endorsements only occurs when the bad type donor has a dominated choice.
Proposition 3 does not yet establish when the donor prefers contributions over
direct endorsements. It is to this topic that we turn next. For that purpose we
compare the expected utility obtained in equilibrium from using direct endorse-
ments to support the challenger with the expected utility obtained from employing
contributions. As is clear from Propositions 1 and 2 multiple equilibria for both
routes exists, which makes a strict preference ordering over the two routes
cumbersome. 16,17 Note, in this context, that in both the endorsement and the
contribution model pooling on no expenditures by the donor types is always an
equilibrium. In these cases the voter takes her decision solely based on prior
information, yielding the donor exactly the same expected utility for both routes.
Likewise, the separating endorsement and contribution equilibria yield the donor
exactly the same equilibrium payoff. Hence the use of either route can yield the
donor exactly the same utility in equilibrium.
Since both models incorporate the same ‘no-expenditures’ pooling possibility,
we take this equilibrium as a benchmark for comparing endorsements with
contributions. For each model we investigate whether the possibilities for informa-
tion transfer lead to an improvement for the donor over this ‘nothing happens’
pooling equilibrium. This benchmark is also useful when one wants to address the
question whether the donor can gain at all from making direct endorsements or
contributions. First we have to establish whether the donor gains from information
Žrevelation anyway. Of course, this depends on the case we consider case I versus
. Žcase IV and on the action the voter takes based on her prior belief p-Õ: elect
.the incumbent, p)Õ: elect the challenger . If information revelation is profitable
for the donor, it is assumed that she will prefer to use the route where information
revelation is indeed possible. In case both contributions and endorsements are
16 Again, we want to emphasis that this problem is not caused by the fact that in the main text we
consider the contribution and endorsement model in isolation. For every specific choice of the
parameters, every equilibrium path described in an equilibrium of one of the two separate models can
be sustained as an equilibrium in the more general model in which the choice between endorsing and
Ž .contributing is endogenous see the appendix . Although in a specific equilibrium of this model the
Ž .donor reveals an unambiguous preference for the use of a specific route or is indifferent , a strict
ordering over the two routes is still cumbersome due to the fact that equilibria revealing conflicting
Žpreferences i.e. an equilibrium in which only endorsements are used and another where only donations
. Ž .are used may exist side by side. This problem partly remains even when we apply a universal
divinity-like refinement concept.
17 In this respect the assumption that endorsing and contributing are equally costly is also rather
restrictive. When we drop this assumption it may appear to be easier to construct a strict preference
ordering. However, such a preference ordering would not only be based on differences in information
revelation possibilities, which is the focus of this paper, but also on cost differences between
endorsements and contributions.
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Žpotentially informative, the route with the most profitable hybrid partially infor-
.mative equilibria and the largest possibilities for separation will be preferred. On
the other hand, when the donor wants to conceal her identity the route with fewer
possibilities for information revelation is preferred. This will also be the case when
the voter’s prior belief induces her to take the action preferred by the donor, for in
that case information transfer is only costly to the donor. Proposition 3 can then be
used to establish the most preferable route for the donor. When we follow this
procedure for the cases I and IV, respectively, Proposition 4 results.
Proposition 4.
Ž . Ž .a In case of no conflict of interests between the donor and the Õoter case I
it holds that:
if i p-Õ : the donor prefers to use endorsements.Ž .
if ii p)Õ : when IRCO holds the bad type donor prefers to useŽ .
contributions n the good type donor prefers
to use endorsements, if not the reÕerse holds.
Ž . Ž .b When the donor prefers the challenger case IV it holds that:
if i p-Õ : when the IRCO condition holds the donor prefers to useŽ .
contributions, whereas in case IRCO does not hold ,
but IRDE does, endorsements are preferred.
if ii p)Õ : when the IRCO condition holds theŽ .
donor prefers to use endorsements, whereas in case
IRCO does not hold , but IRDE does, contributions
are preferred.
Ž .Part a of the proposition states that in case I, when p-Õ, the donor prefers
the use of direct endorsements from an ex ante perspective. That is, not knowing
the type of the challenger and which equilibrium will result by using either
contributions or endorsements, the donor wants to focus on endorsements. The
challenger only stands in the way here. However, when the voter a priori prefers
Ž .the challenger p)Õ , no definite conclusion can be drawn from an ex ante
Ž .viewpoint. Part b of the proposition says that when there is a partial conflict of
interest between the voter and the donor, and the voter is a priori inclined to elect
the incumbent, the donor prefers to use contributions when these are potentially
informative. This follows because the bad type donor does not lose from informa-
tion transfer whereas the good type donor gains from information transfer. Since
under the IRCO condition the possibilities for separation are the largest when
contributions are used, contributions are preferred from an ex ante perspective.
Only when contributions cannot reveal any information, the donor prefers endorse-
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ments when these are potentially informative. On the other hand, when the voter a
priori prefers the challenger the donor prefers not to use contributions when these
may be informative, whereas in case contributions cannot reveal any information,
Žbut endorsements can, the donor prefers the use of contributions to avoid
.informative equilibria with wasteful expenditures .
Ž .Due to the assumption of rational Bayesian decision making, ex ante the voter
can never be made worse off by the possibility of expenditures on campaigning or
direct endorsements. Hence according to this model the voter would prefer that
both endorsements and political campaigns are possible, for this maximizes the
opportunities for separation. From Proposition 3 it follows that, generically, the
voter does not prefer the one above the other.
5. Concluding discussion
Our analysis has provided some answers to the questions that were posed in the
introduction. The main points can be summarized as follows. First, the simple
benchmark model presented in Section 2 gives a theoretical explanation for the
empirical observation that campaign expenditures increase the probability of
election. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey
useful information about the candidate’s type, that is, whether or not the chal-
lenger will be better for the voter than the incumbent. This transmission of
information is only possible when there is some congruence between the voter’s
and the candidate’s interests. In particular, a challenger must value the vote more
highly when his policy stance serves the voter’s interests better than the incum-
bent’s does. Second, the extended model shows that if there is not enough
congruence of interests between the candidate and the voter, campaigns may still
be influential provided that the money for the campaign is donated by a donor who
indeed has preferences that are congruent with the voter’s. If the voter can have
more faith in the donor than in the candidate, the fact that the campaign money is
contributed by the donor may reassure her about the candidate’s position. Thirdly,
the model gives an explanation why interest groups may donate to an election
campaign of a candidate, rather than reaching out to the voter directly by means of
endorsements. When the preferences of the donor and the voter are not sufficiently
aligned, direct information transmission to the voters is not possible. In that case
the donor may exploit the stronger congruence between the preferences of the
voter and the candidate.
An important feature of the model is that, in contrast with earlier models, the
influence of campaign expenditures and contributions on voting behavior does
neither rest on the assumption that campaigns are informative, nor on any
exogenous cost of lying, nor on the assumption that donors act non-strategically.
In our model the influence of campaign expenditures and contributions is endoge-
nously derived. Moreover, although the model is rather simple, it yields some
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interesting welfare implications and comparative statics, which we will briefly
summarize here.
In the model the possibility of campaigning andror endorsing never makes the
voter worse off ex ante. The candidate, on the other hand, may either benefit or
lose when campaigning is possible. Campaigning does never harm and sometimes
improves his case with the voter. However, when the voter is a priori already
inclined to vote for the candidate, the cost of campaigning may make the candidate
worse off as compared to the case where campaigning would not be possible. In
this situation, campaign expenditures constitute a pure social waste when they do
not convey useful information to the voter, as happens in a pooling equilibrium.
Similar results hold for the donor. If the voter needs to be persuaded, spending
money to do so may be beneficial. However, if the prior intentions of the voter are
already favorable for the donor, the possibility to spend money on contributions or
endorsements is not attractive. In addition, it could be shown that there is no
unambiguous preference for either channel of political influence. Under a specified
range of circumstances the donor prefers to contribute to a candidate’s campaign,
at other instances she is better off by reaching out to the voter directly. The
comparative statics results of the model suggest that campaigns and direct
endorsements become more likely the lower the costs of these activities, the higher
the stakes for the candidate andror donor in getting the candidate elected, and the
closer the electoral contest is expected to be. Moreover, the impact of a campaign
or an endorsement appears to be positively related to ratio of the costs of these
activities and the stakes the agents have in persuading the voter to elect the
candidate.
For an assessment of the relevance of our model from an empirical point of
view, a number of empirical findings can be mentioned that are suggestive in this
respect. First, the model reveals that contributions are more likely to be addressed
Ž .to challengers which are on the same side as the donor i.e., when d , d )0 .1 2
This result is in line with empirical evidence indicating that donors often give
Žalong ideological and partisan lines e.g., Chappell, 1982; Poole and Romer,
.1985 . Second, the model predicts that campaign expenditures and contributions
are highest when the election is expected to be close. This result is well
Ždocumented in the empirical literature e.g., Kau and Rubin, 1982; Poole and
.Romer, 1985 . Third, a finding concerning endorsements – albeit not very robust
– is that business interests receive a less favorable hearing from voters than
Žideological and labor groups Kau and Rubin, 1979; Lupia, 1994a; Schneider and
.Naumann, 1982 . The latter type of groups are perhaps more encompassing and,
for that reason, their preferences may be more aligned with the interests of a
representative voter. In terms of the model of Section 4 this might be reflected by
the fact that the IRDE condition holds for these groups, whereas it does not hold
for the business groups. The observation that endorsements are typically used by
Ž .labor unions cf. Schlozman and Tierney, 1986 may point in a similar direction.
Ž .Furthermore, a recent experimental study by Lupia 1992, 1994b provides
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some support for the contention that the amount of campaign expenditures may
provide the voter information about the policy position of the candidate. In his
model incompletely informed voters use the observation that an agenda setter has
Žpaid a certain amount of money to contest an election in order to change the
.commonly known status quo as a cue for the content of an unobserved alternative.
In case the agenda setter does not contest the election and, hence, makes no
expenditures, the status quo prevails. The Lupia model is linked to our benchmark
model of Section 2 for the case p-Õ, where the agenda setter replaces the
challenger and the status quo is substituted for the incumbent’s policy position.
The experiments showed that the observation that the setter paid a substantial
amount in order to contest the election was an effective substitute for complete
information.
At the end of the paper, we would like to point at a number of extensions which
would make the model more realistic. We first consider the role of the incumbent.
This role could be made more prominent, for example, by allowing the incumbent
to engage in campaign expenditures as well. Preliminary results of such a
Ž .‘two-senders model’ Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994; Potters, 1992 indicate that
an incumbent will particularly focus on ‘counter-campaigning’. If, a priori, the
vote is likely to be in his favor, the incumbent will mainly spend money to
Ž Ž .counteract the campaign of the challenger. Gerber and Lupia 1995 extend the
Ž . Ž .Lupia 1992 model discussed above by adding an opponent incumbent to the
Ž .agenda setter challenger . Their assumption that the incumbent can only engage in
.counter-campaigning is justifiable in the light of this result. Hence, the expendi-
tures of the challenger are a major determinant of the expenditures of the
Ž Ž ..incumbent cf. the empirical evidence in Jacobson 1980 . Incidentally, these
results provide a rationale for the focus in this paper on the explanation of the
challenger’s expenditures. These results are only preliminary, however, as they do
Ž .not incorporate the possibility that donations from interested parties are a main
source for the expenditures of both the challenger and the incumbent.
Secondly, the model would become more realistic if the level of campaign
expenditures and donations were a continuous decision variable of the challenger
and the donor, respectively. Allowing for levels between 0 and yq would not
Ž q.change much, however. As long as the upper bound y satisfies the conditions
Ž .that are derived in the text Corollaries 1–3 , the existence of various types of
equilibria remains essentially unchanged. Only if no upper bound is put on the
Žlevel of expenditures, the scope for information transmission is enlarged specifi-
cally, yq drops out of the conditions in Corollaries 1–3 on the existence of
.informative equilibria . Hence, the existence of upper bounds on campaign
donations may in effect reduce the scope for information transfer and an informed
Ž .decision by the voter cf. Palda and Palda, 1985 . Since voters typically a priori
Ž .prefer incumbents p-Õ in our model , such upper bounds may limit the
challengers’ electoral opportunities.
A third extension relates to the assumption that the state of the world is
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exogenously fixed. Although it is quite reasonable to assume that a challenger is
either better or worse for the voter than the incumbent, it would be more realistic
to assume that the challenger’s type is partly determined by the candidate himself
Ž .and the incumbent . Hence, an interesting extension would be to make the role of
Žthe challenger more substantive by making his policy stance endogenous cf.
.Lupia, 1992 .
Another extension concerns the voter in the model. For simplicity, it was just
assumed that the voter could be considered as being ‘representative’ or ‘decisive’.
It would be interesting to consider, for example, a spectrum of voters who differ
Ž .according to the prior probability p with which they believe the challenger to be
the best choice. Another, but related possibility, would be to consider a spectrum
Ž .of voters who differ according to the stake Õ , Õ they have in selecting the best1 2
candidate available. An extension along these lines would allow the decisive
Ž .median voter to be determined endogenously.
Finally, it would be nice to account for the fact that candidates typically receive
funds from a large number of donors. When campaign contributions serve the
purpose of getting the favored candidate elected by informing voters, a free rider
problem may exist among the supporters of a particular candidate. A severe free
rider problem among the candidate’s potential donors, then, may affect the
Ž .candidate’s campaign funds and hence his her possibilities for electoral success.
On the other hand, rational voters should take into account the different incentives
for supporters to contribute to the campaign of their candidate, and thus the
Želectoral consequences of the free rider problem may be attenuated cf. Lohmann,
.1995 . When a spectrum of donors is considered who differ in respect to their
Ž .stake d , d , it might be possible to assess whether the effect of the free rider1 2
problem on the level of information transmission dominates the greater potential
for information transmission due to the existence of multiple senders.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we state all the equilibria for the following game. First, nature
 4draws the type of the donor–challenger combination tg Worse, Better , with
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Ž .P tsBetter sp. Next the donor chooses from two or three options. The donor
q Ž .decides either to contribute y to the challenger unobservable to the voter , or to
q Ž .spend y on direct endorsements observable to the voter , or not to spend money
Ž .at all. In case the donor prefers the incumbent d -0 , only the first and thirdi
option are available for the donor. Then the challenger decides whether to spend
the contributions received on his campaign or not. The voter either observes an
endorsement, a campaign by the challenger, or none of these, and subsequently
chooses between the incumbent and the challenger. The equilibria for the models
of Sections 2 and 3 follow from the equilibria of this more general game.
In the description of the equilibria we refer to the voter as player V, to the
challenger as player C and to the donor as player D. The strategy of player V is
Ž . Ž . Ž .denoted as Õ m . Here Õ m gives the conditional probability that the voter will
Ž . Želect the challenger, given that she has received ‘message’ m, i.e. Õ m sP xs
< .  q q4 qC message m received for mg 0, y , z . In our notation msy indicates
that the challenger runs a costly campaign, mszq indicates that the donor makes
a direct and costly endorsement in support of the challenger, and ms0 indicates
the absence of both an endorsement and a campaign. Note that endorsements and
donations are equally costly to the donor; both have yq as cost. We denote the
Ž .state tsWorse as t and the state tsBetter as t . Let c t denote the1 2 i
Ž .conditional probability that the challenger engages in campaigning – sends
message msyq – given that his type equals t and that he received contributionsi
Ž . Ž q < q .from the donor. More formally, c t sP msy ysy , ts t for is1, 2,i i
where y denotes the amount of funds received from the donor. The challenger’s
strategy when he did not receive any contributions is trivially determined by the
fact that in that case he has only one option to choose, namely not to campaign.
Ž q < .Hence P msy ys0, ts t s0 for is1, 2 in all equilibria. In subsequenti
specifications of equilibria only the challenger’s strategy when contributions are
received will be mentioned. Lastly, the strategy of the donor depends on her type
Ž Ž . Ž .. Ž .and is given by the two-tuple d t , e t , for is1, 2, with d t the probabilityi i i
q Ž .that the donor will contribute y to the challenger, and e t the probability thati
the amount yq is spent on an endorsement. Since the donor can either donate or
Ž . Ž . Ž .endorse and not both we have 0Fd t qe t F1. Due to this assumption,i i
Ž . Ž .1yd t ye t gives the probability that no money is spent. In addition, since thei i
Ž .donor cannot endorse the incumbent we have e t s0 when d -0. The priori i
Ž .probability that the state of the world t equals t is given by P ts t sp. We2 2
 Ž .4 Ž . 4use g to denote gs p 1yÕ r 1yp Õ . It holds that p-Õmg-1.
Concerning the payoffs of the agents we make the same initial assumptions as
in the text: Õ , c )0, for is1, 2, yq)0, and no ‘knife-edge’ cases. 18 Wheni i
18 Ž . q qMore specifically, the ‘no-knife-edge cases’ NKE assumption entails: y /c ; y / d ; c / di i j i
for i, js1, 2; c /c ; d / d and p/ Õ.1 2 1 2
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Bayes’ rule does not apply for message m in equilibrium there is freedom in
Ž . Ž .choosing the voter’s posterior belief q m , and thus her strategy Õ m . Due to this
freedom, a specific equilibrium path may be compatible with various out of
equilibrium strategies and beliefs. Since every equilibrium path is sustainable by
Ž . Ž .choosing q m sÕ m s0 for each out of equilibrium message m, we assume
that out of equilibrium actions and beliefs take this specific form. In order to
describe the equilibria in a neat way, we will use the indicator function I , which A4
equals one if A holds, and zero otherwise. We now list the equilibria of the game
described above. 19
Pooling equilibria:
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .a no further restrictions PE1: d t se t sc t si i i
Ž q.0 for i s 1, 2, Õ z s
Ž q. Ž .Õ y s0, Õ 0 s I . p) Õ4
Ž . q  4 Ž . Ž .b y -min c , c , d , d and p)Õ PE2: d t s1, e t s0 and1 2 1 2 i i
Ž . Ž q.c t s1 for is1, 2, Õ zi
Ž q. Ž .s0, Õ y s1 and Õ 0 s
0.
Ž . q  4 Ž . Ž .c y -min d , d and p)Õ PE3: d t s0, e t s1 and1 2 i i
Ž . Ž q.c t s0 for is1, 2, Õ zi
Ž q. Ž .s1 and Õ y sÕ 0 s0.
Ž . q  4 20 Ž . Ž . Ž .d y -min c , d , d and p)Õ PE4: c t d t qe t s12 1 2 i i i
Ž .for is1, 2, with g e t G2
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .e t , g d t Gd t , d t1 2 1 2
Ž . Ž .) 0, e t ) 0, c t s2 1
Ž . Ž q.qI , c t s1, Õ z s y - c 4 21
Ž q. Ž .Õ y s1 and Õ 0 s0.
Hybrid equilibria:
( )1 p-z:
19 Ž .We do not use equilibrium refinements. Applying a refinement concept similar to universal
divinity leads for every choice of parameters to a unique type of equilibrium when p- Õ. The pooling
equilibrium does not exist when information transfer is possible, and the hybrid equilibrium HE4 does
Ž .not exist when separation SE1 is possible. When p) Õ, however, even after applying this refinement
the type of equilibrium is not unique.
20 Although PE4 is strictly speaking not a pooling equilibrium – as by using the equilibrium
strategies of the agents the voter may improve upon her prior belief concerning the challenger’s type –
the updated belief in PE4 never leads to a decision different from the decision based on the voters prior
Ž .belief, in contrast to the hybrid equilibria HE specified below. Moreover, the combined campaigning
Ž Ž . Ž . Ž ..and endorsing strategy c t d t q e t of the two types of donor–challenger combinations is thei i i
same in this equilibrium. Strictly speaking, it would be best to characterize PE4 as a non-influential or
essentially uninformative equilibrium.
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Ž . q  4 Ž . Ž .e y - c - min c , g d , d HE1: d t s d t s 1,1 2 1 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .e t se t s0, c t sg ,1 2 1
Ž . Ž q. Ž q.c t s1, Õ z s0, Õ y2
q Ž .sy rc and Õ 0 s0.1
Ž .  q 4  4 Ž . Ž .f max y , g d -c -min c , d , d HE2: d t sg d rc , d t1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .s1, e t se t s0, c t1 2 1
Ž . Ž q.sc rd , c t s1, Õ z1 1 2
Ž q. qs 0, Õ y s y rc and1
Ž .Õ 0 s0.
Ž . q  4 Ž . Ž .g y -d -min c , c , d HE3: d t sg , d t s1,1 1 2 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .e t s e t s 0, c t s1 2 1
Ž . Ž q. Ž q.c t s1, Õ z s0, Õ y2
q Ž .sy rd and Õ 0 s0.1
Ž . q Ž . Ž .h y - d - d HE4: d t s d t s 0,1 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .e t sg , e t s1, c t1 2 1
Ž . Ž q. qsc t s0, Õ z sy rd2 1
Ž q. Ž .and Õ y sÕ 0 s0.
Ž . q  4 Ž . Ž .i y - d - min c , c , d HE5: d t s g d t ) 0,1 1 2 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .e t sg e t )0 and d t1 2 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .qe t s1, c t sc t s2 1 2
Ž q. Ž q. q1, Õ z s Õ y s y rd1
Ž .and Õ 0 s0.
( )2 p)z:
Ž .  q  44 Ž . Ž . Ž .j max y , min c , d -c - 1y1rg d HE6: d t s0, d t s1,1 1 2 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .e t s e t s 0, c t s1 2 1
Ž . Ž .I , c t s 1y1rg ,c - c 4 22 1
Ž q. Ž q.Õ z s0, Õ y s1 and
Ž . qÕ 0 s1yy rc .2
Ž .  q  4 Ž . 4 Ž . Ž . Žk max y , min c , d , 1y1rg d -c -d HE7: d t s0, d t s 11 1 2 2 2 1 2
. Ž . Ž .y1rg d rc , e t se t2 2 1 2
Ž . Ž .s0, c t s I , c t1 c - c 4 22 1
Ž q. Ž q.sc rd , Õ z s0, Õ y2 2
Ž . qs1 and Õ 0 s1yy rc .2
Ž .  q  44 Ž . Ž . Žl max y , min c , d -d -c HE8: d t s0, d t s 11 1 2 2 1 2
. Ž . Ž .y 1rg , e t s e t s 0,1 2
Ž . Ž .c t s I , c t s 1,1 d - c 4 22 1
Ž q. Ž q.Õ z s0, Õ y s1 and
Ž . qÕ 0 s1yy rd .2
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Ž .  q 4 Ž . Ž .m max y , d -d HE9: d t sd t s0,1 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Že t s 0, e t s 1 y1 2
. Ž . Ž .1rg , c t s c t s 0,1 2
Ž q. Ž q.Õ z s1, Õ y s0 and
Ž . qÕ 0 s1yy rd .2
Ž .  q 4 Ž . Ž .n max y , d - d - c HE10: d t s e t s 0,1 2 2 1 1
Ž . Ž . Ž .d t q e t s 1 y 1rg2 2
Ž . Ž .and d t ) 0, e t ) 0,2 2
Ž . Ž .c t s I , c t s 1,1 d - c 4 22 1
Ž q. Ž q.Õ z s1, Õ y s1 and
Ž . qÕ 0 s1yy rd .2
Ž .  q Ž . 4 Ž . Ž . Žo max y , c , 1y1rg d -c -d -d HE11: d t s0, d t s 11 1 2 1 2 1 2
. Ž . y 1rg d rc , e t s g 11 2 1
Ž . 4 Ž .y 1 y 1rg d rc , e t1 2 2
Ž .s 1 y 1 y 1rg d rc ,1 2
Ž . Ž .c t s 0, c t s c rd ,1 2 2 1
Ž q. Ž q . Ž qÕ z s1y y rc q y r2
. Ž q. Ž .d , Õ y s1 and Õ 0 s11
yyqrc .2
Separating equilibria:
Ž .  4 q  4 Ž . Ž .p min c , d -y -min c , d SE1: d t s0, d t s1,1 1 2 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .e t s e t s 0, c t s1 2 1
Ž . Ž q.qI , c t s1, Õ z s y - c 4 21
Ž q. Ž .0, Õ y s1 and Õ 0 s0.
Ž . q Ž . Ž .q d -y -d SE2: d t sd t s0,1 2 1 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .e t s0, e t s1, c t s1 2 1
Ž . Ž q.c t s 0, Õ z s 1 and2
Ž q. Ž .Õ y sÕ 0 s0.
Ž . q  4 Ž . Ž .r d - y - min c , d SE3: d t s e t s 0,1 2 2 1 1
Ž . Ž . Ž .d t qe t s1 with d t2 2 2
Ž . Ž .)0 and e t )0, c t s2 1
Ž . Ž q.qI s c t s 1, Õ z y - c 4 21
Ž q. Ž .sÕ y s1 and Õ 0 s0.
In some equilibrium specifications above in which the donor both contributes
and endorses with positive probability, in fact a continuum of equilibria are
Ž .described i.e. PE4, HE5, HE10 and SE3 . These equilibria, however, do not differ
in an essential way. When a specific donor type is indifferent between donating
and endorsing, she may have some leeway in choosing one of the two options,
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leading to a large number of equilibria. More generally, note that the restrictions
on the parameters for the existence of specific types of equilibria overlap each
other; for a large range of parameter values there are multiple equilibria.
The equilibria of the model of Section 2 are obtained from the equilibria above
Ž . Žby considering only those equilibria which satisfy e t s0 for is1, 2 i.e. noi
. Ž . Ž .endorsements , and for which the implication c t )0´d t s1 for is1, 2 isi i
Žsatisfied that is, whenever the challenger intends to spend money he is assured of
.funds . The latter implication can be established by letting d ™ . For thei
Ž . Ž .campaigning equilibria we only have to interpret c t slightly different; c t nowi i
represents the probability that the challenger engages in costly campaigning, given
that his type equals t . The equilibria of the benchmark model are given by PE1,i
PE2, HE1, HE6 and SE1.
The equilibria of the contributions model of Section 3 are obtained by focusing
on those equilibria where no endorsements are made, which are the equilibria with
Ž .e t s0 for is1, 2. This leaves PE1, PE2, HE1, HE2, HE3, HE6, HE7, HE8,i
and SE1. Lastly, the equilibria of the model where only endorsements are possible
Ž .are given by those equilibria that satisfy d t s0 for is1, 2. An alternative wayi
Ž .to obtain these equilibria is to set c s0 for is1, 2 , that is, by makingi
contributions to the challenger’s an unattractive option since he will never spend
.them on a campaign . The endorsement equilibria are given by PE1, PE3, HE4,
HE9 and SE2.
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